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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 10, 1986 Conference
List 1, sheet 1
No. 86-133
NOLLAN, et ux.
compensation)

(desire just

from Cal. Ct. App.
Stone, Gilbert)

v.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMN.
1.

SUMMARY:

Appants challenge Cal. Ct. App.'s failure to

---·-

evaluate whether
Fifth Amendment

Timely

State/Civ.

just compensation was owing to petrs under the

after

determining

that the Cal.

Coastal Commn.

properly attached to a construction permit a condition requiring
public access across appants' beach property.
~-----------------------------2.
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:
Appants own a property on

the beach in Ventura Co., Cal.

On Mar. 1, 1982, they applied for

a

to

coastal

house

development

located

on

permit

their

lot.

demolish

Appants

beach house with a larger residence.
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- 2 Coastal

Commn.

approved

appants'

permit

with

a

condition

requiring lateral public access across their property.
later filed in a Cal.

Appants

trial court a petn for a writ of mandate.

The court, on Jan. 18, 1983, ordered that a writ of mandate issue
remanding

the

hearing.

case

Upon

application
access.

to

the

remand,

permit

with

Commission

the
the

for

Commission

a

full

again

condition requiring

evidentiary

approved

lateral public

The trial court then issued a peremptory writ of mandate

commanding

the

condition.

The Commission appealed to the Cal. Ct. App.

Commission

to

The CA of Cal. reversed.
court

the

found

appants'

that

to the

nee ~ot

error.

evidence

sea."

the

permit

without

the

The CA first noted that the trial
did

project would create a

public access
access

the

issue

not

support

a

finding

that

"direct or cumulative burden on

Because a direct burden on public

be demonstrated, the trial court's ruling was in

In Grupe v. California Coastal Commission, 166 Cal.App.3d

landowner owned one of six remaining undeveloped beach fronts in
a

group of

29 adjacent lots.

The 29 lots were located between

two beaches open to public use.

Grupe applied for

a permit to

build a large single family residence and the Commission approved
the permits subject to a requirement that Grupe offer to dedicate
a

public

court

access

in Grupe

easement

providing

access

to

the

held that the access condition was

beach.

The

related to a

need for public access to which Grupe's project contributed, even
though,

standing alone,

it had not created the need for access.

The Grupe court also held that the exaction did not constitute a

I

- 3 "taking" because, although it caused a diminution in the value of
Grupe's property,

it did not deprive him of a reasonable use of

his

The

property.

CA

'--in

the

present

case

dismissed

~

appants'contention that they need not provide public access over
their property because there is adequate public access nearby.
3.
under

Appants

CONTENTIONS:
the

Fiftn

Amendment

to

contend
just

that

they

compensation

are
for

entitled
the

Cal.

Coastal Commn's condition attached to their permit. The condition
exacts
use.
such

a dedication of
This

as

case

Agins

is
v.

access

different
City

of

across
from

their

property for

public

the regulatory takings cases

Tiburon,

447

u.s.

255

(1980).

This

Court has not directly addressed to what extent, and under what
circumstances, an owner may be required by the State to give away
real

property without

approval

to make

this Court

compensation as

some

indicate,

use

however,

that determines whether
v. Causby, 328
of

this

u.s.

Court

of

stated

land.

has occurred.

(1945).
that

receiving

Several precedents of

that it is the loss

a "taking"

256, 261

have

his

a condition of

to the owner
United States

Moreover, several decisions
the

purpose

of

the

Just

Compensation Clause is to ensure that some individuals alone are
not forced to bear fully the cost of public benefits that, in all
fairness,

should be borne by the public as a whole.

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
(1978).

438

See, e.g. ,

u.s.

104, 123

Yet the Cal. CA has refused to consider appants' claim

that they are being forced to bear an unfair share of the cost of
a

public

benefit.

The Cal.

courts,

contrary to these general principles.

however,

have

taken a view

In Georgia-Pacific Corp.

- 4 v. California Coastal Commission, 132 Cal.App.3d 678 (1982), the
court stated that "a regulatory body may constitutionally require
a dedication of property in the interest of the general welfare
as a condition of permitting land development.

It does not act

in

validity of

eminent

domain

when

it

does

this,

and

the

th e

dedication requirement is not dependent on a factual showing that
the development has created the need for it."
In the present case, the court determined that the exaction
was valid because it was authorized by a statute that is a valid
exercise

of

the

State's police

power.

In several

cases,

this

Court has stated that the evaluation of the constitutionality of
the governmental act does not cease with a determination that the
Act was a valid exercise of the police power.
States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459

u.s.

See, e.g., United

70 (1982).

The Cal.

Coastal Act was admittedly enacted to benefit the public welfare.
Nevertheless,

it

is

a

separate

question whether

the

statute's

application to appants would require the payment of compensation.
Appants are clearly entitled to compensation in this case.
exaction
;fo

of

property

interest

real

property

appants

from

is

not

The

regulation.

Appants~are being required to give up to the govt a recognized
and

residential property.

to

suffer

a

physical

invasion

of

their

The public has preempted appants' right to

private enjoyment of the property they purchased. This Court has
held that "the

right to exclude others is generally one of the

most essential sticks
characterized

u.s.

as

in the bundle of rights that are commonly

propety."

Kaiser

Aetna

v.

United

States,

444

164 (1979). Moreover, appants replacement of a single house,

- 5 -

entirely on private property, has not created the public need for
additional

state owned beach.

No findings

that such an effect

occurred were made by either the Commission or the courts below.
Appee

argues

constitutional

law

that

appants

uniformly

attack

applied

this Court has concurred either
dismissals of prior appeals.

in

principles

California

by express

with which

holdings

or

through

In Associated Home Builders of the

Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, et al., 404
878

(1971),

upholding

of

this Court concurred with a Cal.

u.s.

Sup. Ct. decision

the constitutionality of dedication requirements as a

condition to approval of new development.
rejected an appeal,

Similarly, this Court

for lack of a substantial federal question,

in a case challenging appellee's ability to require fees in lieu
of actual dedications for

provision of public access.

v. California Coastal Commission, 106 S.Ct. 241

Remmenga

(1985) •

In that

case, the Cal. Ct. App. had upheld imposition of fees, in lieu of
provision

of

challenge

identical

opinion

of

dedicated

the

Cal.

public access,

to

that

Ct.

proffered

App.

is

against
by

a

constitutional

appellant

consistent

with

here.

The

this Court's

decisions analyzing whether governmental regulation amounts to a
taking.
of

the

taking

As this Court stated in
general
if

the

zoning

law

ordinance

to

does

Tiburon, supra, the application
a

particular

not

property

substantially

affects

advance

a

state

interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.
Moreover, this Court has recognized that a mere diminution in the
value
Transp.

of

property

Co.

v.

cannot

amount

New York City,

438

to

u.s.

a

taking.
104, 131

Penn
(1978).

Central
Next,

-

petrs

argue

that

the

6 -

questions

narrow and factually specific.
is not a proper appeal.

presented

permit

this

appeal

are

Finally, appees argue that this

The validity of the California Coastal
Rather, appnts challenge

Act was not drawn into question below.
the

in

decision

of

the

Coastal

Cal.

constitutionality of various provisions of

Commn.

The

the Cal. Coastal Act

was not the basis for the decision of the state appellate court.
4.
appears

DISCUSS ION:
to be

any state"
orders of
exercise

Contrary

a proper

appeal.

u.s.c.

in 28

to

appees'

assertion,

this

The reference to a "statute of
has been defined to encompass

§1257(2)

state commisioners and governing bodies issued in the
of

their

delegated

legislative

authority.

If

the

particular order in question has the force of law, the order may
be deemed a statute for the purposes of §1257(2). See Lathrop v.
Donohue,
BRENNAN) .

367

u.s.

Appees

820,

824-825

of

JUSTICE

the decision of

the Cal.

(1981)

do not contend that

(opinion

Coastal Commn. does not have the force of law.
On the merits, appants claims do not appear to merit plenary
review.

This

Court

has

held

that

the

application

of

state

regulations, such as zoning ordinances, to a particular property
effects a taking if the regulation does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land. See Tiburon, supra.
that

the

permit

condition

accord with this test.
permit

condition

California's

not

constitute

a

taking

is

in

The Cal. Coastal Act and the particular
issue

at

interest

does

The Cal CA's determination

in

here

providing

substantially
the

public

to

furthers
access

to

- 7 -

tidelands. See Grupe, supra. In addition, appants may still build
their improved dwelling and therefore are not denied economically
viable use of their land.
I recommend DFWSFQ.
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To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob

No. 86-133, Nollan et ux. v. California Coastal Commission

Although
thought,

still

I

this

is

a

recommend

closer
DFWSFQ.

question
The

than

-

issue

I

is

originally
whether
....____

the

State takes property by refusing to grant a construction permit
unless the property owner grants a public easement.

There is no

doubt that the property would be more valuable if the owner were
permitted to build without granting an easement.

The Court, how-

ever, has dismissed appeals challenging California's practice of
requiring

developers

to

"dedicate"

property as a condition for

approving new real estate developments,v;;sociated Home Builders
v.

City of Walnut Creek,

et al.,

404 U.S.

878

(1971),

and

its

practice of requiring cash payments in lieu of dedication of real
property, Remmenga v. Californai Coastal Commission,
241

(1985).

This governmental

106

s.

Ct.

regulation does not deprive the

owner of an economically viable use of his land, and it substantially advances California's interest in providing public access
to beaches.
the

Court

These are the conditions set out in your opinion for
in Agins

v.

City

of Tiburon,

447

U.S.

There is no physical occupation of the property.

255

(1980).

(Tiburon was a

page 2.

challenge to a

zoning ordinance,

however,

not a challenge to a

"condition" on a government permit) .
You may wish to vote to NOTE if you think it is time to
reconsider the application of the Court's more general pronouncements

to

requirements

that

property

owners

give

up

valuable

rights in return for construction permits or other valuable "largesse" from the State.

These conditions can have the effect of

assigning a large share of the cost of a public benefit to relatively few property owners.

In this case,

the property-owner's

right to exclude others, a "fundamental attribute of ownership,"
has been limited.

See Tiburon, 447

u.s.,

at 262.
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o' ~ l e \ Le-t +- ~
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
• r -

To:
From:

February 24, 1987

Justice Powell
Leslie

3, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n

Monday, March 30, 1987 (second argument)
I.

Summary

The question presented
building

permit

condition

-----

in this

that

requires

case

is whether

public

access

a
to

walk laterally (parallel to the water) across the beach constitutes

a

taking

requiring

just

compensation

under

the

Fifth Amendment.
II.
On March 1,
with

appellee,

the

1982,

Background
appellants filed an application

California

Coastal

Commission,

for

a

page 2.

coastal

development

square foot,

permit

one story,

to

demolish

an

existing

521

one bedroom summer residence on a

beach front lot and to construct in its place a 1,674 square
foot,

two-story,

~ ree bedroom permanent r~sidence with an

attached

~o

sees of

the property

car garage.

At the time, appellants were les-

and possessed an option to purchase

that was conditioned on either rehabilitating the existing
house or replacing it with a new structure.

A concrete sea-

wall, approximately 8 feet tall and 10 feet from the current
mean

hide

tide 1 ine,

separates the

beach portion of

the

property from the house and its immediate surrounding area.
The lot is one of 138 similar residential lots along a tract
of beach.
On April

7,

1982,

the

Executive

Director

of

the

Coastal Commission issued his determination that appellants
should be granted a development permit with the condition
that appellants first record "a deed restriction acknowledging the right of the public to pass and repass across the

--

property in an area bounded by the mean high tide 1 ine
at one end to the toe of the revetment at the other end."
The determination by the Director that access was required
was based on findings that the proposed developnent would
burden the public's ability to gain access along the shore1 ine by
1 ine,"

"discouraging the public from visiting the shore"congesting existing access roads and

recreational

areas," and "increasing the use of the beach by residents

page 3.

and guests," and because adequate access · did

not already

exist nearby.
The Director made this determination pursuant to the

§ii orn~_:oas_: al

Act of_!!!!] which states that "public

access" along the coast must be a condition of permitting
"new development" along the coastal zone, unless one of several

circumstances

existing nearby."

is

present,

including

"adequate access

"Pass and re ass" access is the least

onerous of the public access conditions exacted by the Commission in granting development permits under
Act.

Other

possible conditions are

use" and "active recreational use."

the Coastal

"passive recreational
The Commission's guide-

1 ines provide "that because the 'pass and repass' condition
severely

limits

the

public's

access

dedication

should

be

used only where necessary to protect the habitat values of
the site, where topographic constraints warrant the restriction, or where it is necessary to protect the privacy of the
landowner.

n

Appellants objected to the Director's determination
and requested a full public hearing.

----------------'---Appellants filed

the request.

The Commission denied

a petition for a writ of ad-

ministrative mandamus in state superior court.

The court

granted the writ and ordered the Commission to hold a full
public hearing on appellants' permit application.

The court

concluded that the Commission could not impose the lateral
access condition in the absence of a

showing that appel-

1 ants' proposed residential development would have an indi-

page 4.

vidual or cumulative adverse impact on public access to the
sea.

The court discounted the relevance to the case of the

Commission's evidence respecting the cumulative impact of
residential construction on vacant lots and found that the
current record did not support the Commission's decision.
On remand, the Commission made further factual findings and reinstated its prior determination, noting that it

----------~-------------------

had similarly conditioned 43 out of 6 0 coastal development
permits along the same tract and that the condition was consistent with the public's historical use of the property.
It found that the proposed structure constituted a "new development"

under

the Act,

that

it would contribute to a

"wall" of structures and would prohibit the public "psychologically"

"from

realizing a

stretch of

coastline exists

nearby that they have every right to visit."

The Commission

also found that there was no adequate alternate access nearby.

13 w:l-

Appellants filed a supplemental petition for a writ

4-~

of administrative mandamus with the state superior court,
which again ruled in their favor.

The court found that the

~

~

general materials relied upon by the Commission were either
not specific to appellants' property or was too speculative,
and thus rejected the Commission's finding that the
ment would burden public access.

rt..A._
~~f

develop- ~

The court also found that

a test for a "new structure" base? on a 10% increase in s_}:._:_/;~

.

was unduly harsh as applied in this case.

Finally,

"""' ,__.,

~~found

page 5.

the

Commission's

determination

that

there

was

inadequate

access nearby erroneous.
The Commission appealed the court's decision.

While

the appeal was pending, appellants exercised their option to
purchase the property and built the proposed residence.

Ap-

pellants did not notify the Commission that they were taking
this action.

The CA reversed the TC' s determination.

The

CA reviewed the Commission's determination under the "substantial evidence" standard.

The CA found that the TC erred

in requiring the Commission to find a "direct or cumulative
burden on access to the sea."

TheCA reasoned as follows:

In Grupe v. California Coastal Cornrn'n, 166 Cal. App.
3d 148, 165 (1985), the court construed the leading California case

on the constitutionality of

Horne Builders,
(1971),

Inc. v.

exactions,

Assocated

City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633

to hold that only an indirect relationship between

an exaction and a need to which the project contributes need
exist.

In Grupe,

the 1 andowner

owned one of 6

remaining

undeveloped beach front lots in a group of 29 adjacent lots
in Santa Cruz County.

The 29 lots were located between two

beaches open to public use.

Grupe applied for a permit to

build a large single family residence to be located behind a
cement wall on his lot.

The Commission approved the permit

subject to a requirement that Grupe dedicate a public access
easement
wall.
to a

between

the mean

high

tide

mark

and the

cement

The court found that the access condition was related
need for public access to which Grupe's project con-

(4

page 6.

tributed,

even though standing alone it had not created the
The court reasoned that the project was

need for access.

one more brick in the wall separating the people of CaliforThe court also bel d that

nia from the state's tidelands.

the exaction did not constitute a taking because although it
caused a diminution of value,

it did not deprive Grupe of

the reasonable use of his property.
As we pointed out in Remmenga v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 163 Cal.

App.

3d 623,

628,

app.

dismissed,

106

s.

Ct. 241 (1985), the justification for required dedication is
not

limited

project.

to

the

needs

of

or

burdens

created

by

the

Here, appellants' project has not created the need

for access to the tidelands fronting their property but it
is a

small project among many others which together 1 imi t

public access to the tidelands and beaches of the state and
therefore

collectively

create

a

need

for

public

access.

Grupe and Remmenga are dispositive of this case.
Appellants'

structure is a "new development" within

the meaning of the statute.
tive access.

There is not adequate alterna-

The Commission's order is affirmed.
III.

Analysis

To determine whether particular governmental actions
result

in takings,

the Court engages in

"ad hoc,

factual

inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case."
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 106
(1986).

The Court has identified three factors

this inquiry : @

s.

Ct. 1018

necess ~
ao

the economic impact of the regulation,

z. ·
he

page 7.

extent to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations,

th ~haracter

and

of

the

Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
104, 124 (1978)

A.

governmental

action."

New York City, 438

u.s.

0

Character of the Governmental Action
,,

\1

This Court has held that "a permanent physical occupation
----, is a

government action of such a

unique character

that it is a taking
without regard to other factors that a
..._..,
court might ordinarily
Manhattan CATV Corp. ,
FCC v.

examine."
458

Florida Power Co.

(1987).

u. s.

Loretto v.

419 ,

43 2

Teleprompter

( 19 8 2 ) •

See also

u.s.

(Pole Attachments),

The intrusion in this case can properly be termed

"physical," thus the rule that a taking "may more readily be
found when the interference with
ized

as

a

physical

Penn Central,

invasion

u.s.,

438

also,

require a

physical

previous

case,

applies.

se rule

~

the restriction is

voluntary action,

occupation.

For

thus it

this

the per se rule of Loretto does not apply.

Attachments, slip. op. at 5-6.
a

government"

reason

See Pole

In Loretto, the Court quoted

Kaiser Aetna v.

United States,

444

u.s.

164, 180 (1979), noting that although "[an] easement of pas-

sage, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not conside red a taking per se,

A.

But the invasion is not

Moreover,

imposed pursuant to appellants'
does not

the

can be character-

anent," thus the

of Loretto does not apply.

'J.

by

at 124.

properly charact

1.

~roperty

Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a

~ .,:.._

·~ -IY~""\\
~

page 8.

physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually
serious character."
Here,

the

Loretto, 458
state

has

easement upon appellants.

u.s.,

imposed

at 433.
a

"pass

On the one hand,

and

repass"

the government

bears a strong burden of justification because of the physical nature of the burden imposed.

This Court has recognized

that the right to exclude others from one's property is "one
of the most essential

sticks in the bundle of rights that

are commonly characterized as property."

u.s.,
weight

at

176.

The

CA

did

not

the state's burden.

of

Kaiser Aetna, 444

properly
Instead,

acknowledge

the

the court treated

the action in this case just like any other type of zoning
regulation.

On the other hand, however, even physical inva-

sions can be justified by a strong state interest, depending
upon the balance of the other factors.
tachments.
est

See, e.g., Pole At-

The lower court identified a strong state inter-

in preserving access to public waters.

Moreover,

the

court found that appellants' building project contributed to
the

need

lants'

to

preserve access.

Thus,

the burden on appel-

property was found to be related to a strong public

purpose.

The question then is whether the burden imposed in

this case is "so substantial" that "'justice and fairness'
require that [it] be borne by the public as a whole."
Forest

Industries,

Inc.

v.

United States,

467

u.s.

Kirby
1,

14

(1984).
The Court could find that the physical invasion in
this case is simply too burdensome.

But the scope of the

page 9.

t-vr
physical

invasion in this case is more limited than it may

"' se~ .

--"""

What is really at issue is l en feet ~ r less

of beach between the high water mark and the sea wall.
The
.....
public onl
has an easement to "pass and repass," which
means

to walk

property

by

appellant's

underneath

The

beach.

state

owns

3a 1- ~
~

I

.
...........

the

the ocean up to the high water mark.

Because of the tides, the water is only up to the high water
mark once a day.
mark,

When the water is not up to the high water

the public can walk along the dry beach and still be

walking on public property.

Appellants have no legal right

to exclude the public from doing this.
the water is high,

Moreover, even when

the public could legally walk in ankle

deep water without physically invading appellants' property.
All of these facts lessen the impact of the actual physical
invasion

of

appellants'

property.

The

broadens the physical area in which the
but does not

create

the fact

easement

slightly

public may walk,

that appellants must put up

with public passage very close to their property.
The state acted pursuant to its police power and the
state interest at issue is substantial.
to

preserve

source for

the

use of

the use of

The state is trying

.

a valuable and limited publ1c reall citizens.

The court found that

appellants' project was "one more brick in the wall separating the people of

California from the state's tidelands."

The state found that as a condition for contributing to the
separation,

appellants had to compensate in another way to

preserve the status quo.

Balancing the nature of the intru-

5 ~~

~~
~

~J.~'-M..!.
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sion on the landowner against the nature of the state action,

it does not appear

that the character of the state

action alone should lead to a finding of a taking.
B.

Reasonable Inv,estment-backed Expectations

"The timing of acquisition of [property] is relevant
to

a

takings

analysis

expectation."

of

[the

owner's]

investment-backed

u.s.

51, 64-65 (1979).

Andrus v. Allard, 444

Notice of extensive government regulation weighs against a
finding of

a taking.

Connolly,

supra.

7

A strong argument

can be made in this case that appellants did not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation in the ten foot strip
of property at issue.
First,

appellants have always been on notice that

the public has a right of access to the publicly-owned wa-

-

ters.

In fact, this right is guaranteed by the

------

~~ con-

-

(J~
~

4,..-

,..,__·' tu

~

stitution, Art. X, §4 ("No individual, partnership, or cor-

~

poration, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands

~~

of a harbor,

bay,

in this State,

inlet, estuary, or other navigable water

shall be permitted to exclude the right of

way to such water whenever it is required for any public
purpose,

nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of

such water;

and the Legislature shall enact such 1 aws as

will give the most 1 iberal construction to this provision,
so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall
be always attainable for the people thereof.").
because of

the public ownership of the waters,

Moreover,
appellants

JATZS-~
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have always been on notice that at any time other than high
tide, the public is free to walk by their beach.

B

their
the

appellants

property

easement

in

this

case

did

unti-!._~Commission' s_

must

be

granted

as

a

not

purchase

decision that

condition

of

access.

~
~~
~~

Third, the evidence below was that the public had been using
the right-of-way without a formal

notation in the deed,

so

appellants may well have lost the right to object and in any
case cannot claim an expectation that they would be able to
exclude

the

public

from

landowners in appellants'
similar easements,

the walkway.

Fourth,

all

other

tract have been required to give

thus sharing the burden among all those

contributing to the burden on public access.
The other side of the argument is that mere notice
of a condition does not insulate it from takings scrutiny if

------

the regulation "so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid."
260

(1980).

Thus,

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447

u.s.

255, ~

the mere fact that appellants had notice

of the burden and that the restriction is rationally related
to a

substantial

constitutional
sonable.

state interest does not insulate it from

challenge if,

on balance,

it appears unrea-

Viewing the investment-backed expectations as one

factor, then, the above considerations weigh in favor of the
constitutional validity of the restriction.
C.

Economically Viable Use of the Land

In Agins, the Court stated that an application of a
state's police power effects a taking only if it "denies an

page 12.

owner economically viable use of his land."
'-

260.
viable

447

u.s.,

at

_---...,J

The deed restriction preserves numerous economically
uses

of

appellants'

land,

both

the entire

parcel,

whose value was probably increased by the ability to build
the larger house, and the ten feet of beach at issue, since
appellants can still conduct any activities that also permit
public access.
however,

Instead of ending the inquiry at this point,

it appears better to balance all factors.

was decided in the context of a
strict ion.

This

case

involves

Agins

typical zoning "use" rea

physical

invasion

that }

calls for greater scrutiny.
D.

The ~uggests

Synthesis

a two-part test for determining the

constitutionality of a restriction such as that at issue in
this case.

~ the

~ondi tion

permit

same legitimate governmental

must advance the

purpose furthered by the re-

striction the permit excuses. ~ the condition must be
reasonably designed both in character and degree to address
those

burdens that the developnent

impose on the public.

of

the property would

These considerations appear appropri-

ately to focus the inquiry on "whether the restriction on
private property 'force[es] some people alone to bear public
..··

burdens which,

in all fairness and justice, should be borne

by the public as a whole. '"

Prune Yard Shopping Center v.

Robins, 447

u.s.

74, 83 (1980)

States, 364

u.s.

40, 49 (1960)).

(quoting Armstrong v. United

page 13.

The Court could strike the balance, given the facts
in the record.
fin~ ng

a

action.

There are two strong arguments that support

--------------------------

t ~ ing.

First, the character of the governmental

This Court has indicated that it is very hard to

justify a

physical

intrusion,

for a private dwelling.

especially on property

Second,

used

the CA specifically found

that the deed restriction need not be justified by a direct
burden

caused

indirect

by

burden

appellants'
caused

by

It

building.

all

other

found

that an

developuents

in

the

tract and projected future develo{Xnent on access needs was
sufficient to support imposing the building condition.

The

Court could find that where a physical invasion is at issue,
a direct relationship between the burden caused and the condition is required.

"

The better view appears to be that even the physical
access conditio n' at issue in this case can be justified by a

-

sufficiently important gov ernrnental purpose.
is not unilaterally imposed

The condition
\

(as it was for example in Penn

Central), but comes into play only when property owners seek
to improve their homes.

Although this consideration is not

dispositive, it lessens the impact of the condition by giving the landowners a choice.

-

Also, the direct/indirect bur-

den distinction of the CA appears to make sense.

By taking

into account all the present and projected developments, the
Commission can best spread the burden of access conditions
among all landowners.
impose an access

If a direct burden were required to

condition,

it would create the anomalous

page 14.

situation where

the

first

nine

homeowners

to

build

in

a

tract would not be required to grant access, because access
on lot 10 was still available.
10 sought to build,

Then, when the owner of lot

there would be no other available ac-

cess, and an access condition on his property would be justif ied.

In the context of booming devel opnent and a sea rce
1..._.

resource like access to the ocean,

the CA' s

'---

"brick in the

wall" concept appears to make sense.
Whichever result appears more appropriate, however,
the

que~ n

is

wheth~r

the

se~ord

this Court to strike the balance,
the lower court is appropriate.

. ...______\

-

is developed enough for

---

or whether

a remand to

TheCA relied on its previ-

ous decision in Grupe, so a brief analysis of that case is
required.
In Grupe,

the CA noted that it had previously held

that, as a general proposition, the Commission may constitutionally require uncompensated access dedication as a condition of

approving coastal

developnent.

Resp in that case

was subject to to a greater condition of access than petrs
in this case:
tween
well
the

his

Grupe was required to dedicate the area be-

seawall

and the ocean for

as passive r ecr ea tional
Commission's general

use.

authority,

"pass and repass" as

Resp did not challenge
but

instead sought to

distinguish the facts of his case on the basis that he was
not a developer but rather a single homeowner.

The CA first

found that the restriction did not deprive resp of all reasonable use or the economic value of his property, and thus

IA_..c.~

L

"'

...,r~
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met the requirement of Agins.

Second, the CA found the fact

that the intrusion was "physical" was not dispositive, citing cases in which this Court denied cert when developers
had been required to dedicate open spaces as parks in order
to obtain development permits.

Finally,

the CA found that

the restriction did not act as "an acquisition of resources
to

permit

or

Central, 438

facilitate

u.s.,

uniquely

public

functions,"

Penn

at 128, because the benefits of the per-

mit arrangement is reciprocal.
The CA in Grupe thus underwent a substantially more
detailed taking analysis than it did in this case.

Since

the issues raised in the two cases are so similar, the Grupe
reasoning can be deemed to be incorporated in this decision.
Even Grupe, however, appears to put too much emphasis on the
remaining

economic value

of

the property,

and

too 1 ittle

analysis on the character of the intrusion and the closeness
of the fit between the governmental objective and the burden
created by the landowners' development.

As indicated above,

it seems that the burden imposed in this case can be justified,

but

the analysis

should

weigh the relative burdens.

case

for

statute will

resolution
continue

and specifically

Also because the application of

a state statute is at issue,
the

carefully

it appears prudent to remand

under

the

proper

to be applied,

standard.

and it is

The

important

that the CA undergo the correct analysis in the future.

l{
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IV.

Conclusion

There are three factors to consider when determining
whether a government restriction constitutes a taking QJ the
character of the governmental

action~he

t~conomic

able investment-backed expectations, and
of the regulation.

impact on reason-

~

~

None of these considerations

impact
dispos-

itive in this case.

~ the invasion is physical, so it

must

~substantial

be justified by

At the same time,
is no

~

it

i~'

governmental

not a permanent

be little

tions,

invasion,~

se taking, and the government interest in protect-

~

ing access to the sea appears strong.
to

interest.

there appears

interference with investment-backed expecta-

since petrs were on notice that land use in Califor~

nia is heavily regulated and that the public has as consti-

ri~

tutional

access to the ocean.

impact does not appear severe.

eY

t-;;;---;conomic

Although the access require-

ment may diminish the land's value,

the improved structure

increases it.
The SG suggests that a

proper test is whether the

restriction furthers the important governmental interest and
whether the degree of

the burden is reasonably

the harm caused by petrs' development.

related to

It appears tha t_ the

restriction at issue could pass muster under this test.

The

better procedure, however, would be to remand so the TC and
CA can undergo the proper analysis in applying the statute
to the facts of this case.
fensible,

the CA

did not

Although the result appears deproperly consider

the degree of

~,L

.?
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burden of

the

find that

the restriction imposed

degree

harm caused by

of

physical

invasion and

petrs'

did

not

specifically

is proportional
development.

to the

Unless the

Court finds that the nature of the restriction is too severe
no matter what the state interest, the proper result appears
to be to VACATE AND REMAND.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86- 133

I

4 'f)
tvz_,v/._

JAMES PATRICK NOLLAN, ET ux., APPELLANT v.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION

~

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

-k~'s-

~J. A-. 1.__
'l"'r,_.-

[June-, 1987]

· JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

~

W"YJ. ~

AAJ

~~

~~

James and Marilyn Nollan appeal from a decision of the ~
California Court of Appeal ruling that the California Coastal ~ ~
~~.,- Co~sion could co-nditio. nits ~t of permission to rebuild
_ L.
/ /
I
n
th~USe On their~nsfer to the public Of an easement
l-/{ ,
(
~
across their beachfront property. Nollan v-:-california
~)
Coastaic:ommisswn, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. .5,_J_, ~.-£/!- JLo
I
28, (1986). The California Court rejected their claim that ~ ---Q- '
imposition ofthat condition violates the Takings Clause ofthe
-~
Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States by the (J --v
Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid. We noted probable jurisdiction. U. S. (1986).
Q I
.
I
/.<::e.~
_

11 _.. _ k..

L._

4

The Nollans own a beachfront lot in Ventura County, Cali- ~
fornia. A quarter-mile north of their property is Faria YkL ~
County Park, an oceanside public park with a public beach
tf'
r •
and recreation area. Another public beach area, known locally as "the Cove," lies 1,800 feet south of their lot. A con- jJc, 7 _
crete seawall approximately eight feet high separates the
l
beach portion of the N ollans' property from the rest of the ~ ~ .
lot. The historic mean high tide line determines the lot's
oceanside boundary.
~
The N ollans originally leased their property with an option ~,I..,~~
to buy. The building on the lot was a small bungalow, total• - · - -- 1) v

7

r

-

~~fl ~ Z
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ing 504 square feet, which for a time they rented to summer
vacationers. After years of rental use, however, the building had fallen into disrepair, and could no longer be rented
out.
The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their
promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. In order
to do so, under California Public Resources Code §§ 30106,
30212, and 30600 (West 1986), they were required to obtain a
coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission. On February 25, 1982, they submitted a permit
application to the Commission in which they proposed to demolish the existing structure and replace it with a three-bedroom house in keeping with the rest of the neighborhood.
The Nollans were informed that their application had been
placed on the administrative calendar, and that the Commission staff had recommended that the permit be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to
pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean
high tide line on one side, and their seawall on the other side.
This would make it easier for the public to get to Faria
County Park and the Cove. The Nollans protested imposition of the condition, but the Commission overruled their objections and gr~nted the permitJ:SuEJ effito their recordation
of a deed restriction granting tlje easement. App. 31, 34.
On June 3, 1982, the Nollans filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus asking the Ventura County Superior
Court to invalidate the access condition. They argued that
the condition could not be imposed absent .evidence that their
proposed development would have a direct adverse impact on
public access to the beach. The court agreed, and remanded
the case to the Commission for a full evidentiary hearing on
that issue. App. 36.
On remand, the Commission held a public hearing, after
which it made further factual findings and reaffirmed its imposition of the condition. It found that the new house would
increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing

86-133-0PINION
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to the development of "a 'wall' of residential structures" that
would prevent the public "psychologically" "from realizing a
stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right
to visit." App. 58. The new house would also increase private use of the shorefront. I d., at 59. These effects of construction of the house, along with other area development,
would cumulatively "burden the public's ability to traverse to
and along the shorefront." I d., at 65-66. Therefore the
Commission could properly require the N ollans to offset that
burden by providing additional lateral access to the public
beaches in the form of an easement across their property.
The Commission also noted that it had similarly conditioned
43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract
of land, and that of the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been approvecl when the Commission did not have administrative
regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and
the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property. /d.,
at 47-48.
The N ollans filed a supplemental petition for a writ of administrative mandamus with the Superior Court, in which
they argued that imposition of the access condition violated
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated
against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court ruled in their favor on statutory ground'8,lrriaing, m }mft to avoid "issues of constitutionality," that the
California Coastal Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§ 30000
et seq., authorized the Commission to impose public access
conditions on coastal development permits for the replacement of an existing single-family home with a new one only
where the ,ero:Qosed development would have an adverse impact on publicaccess to the sea. App. 419. In the Court's
----;-;----.-~
view, the administrative record did not provide an adequate
factual basis for concluding that replacement of the bungalow
with the house would create a direct or cumulative burden on
public access to the sea. I d., at 416-417. Accordingly, the

l

5/cl-
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Superior Court granted the writ of mandamus and directed
that the permit condition be struck.
The Commission appealed to the California Court of Appeal. While that appeal was pending, the Nollans satisfied
the condition on their option to purchase by tearing down the
bungalow and building the new house, and bought the property. They did not notify the Commission that they were
taking that action.
The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28. It disagreed with the Superior Court's interpretation of the Coastal Act, finding that it
required that a coastal permit for the construction of a new
house whose floor area, height or bulk was more than 10%
larger than that of the house it was replacing be conditioned
on a gran .o access.
a . pp. d, a 723-724, 223 Cal.
Rptr., at 31; see Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30212. It also ruled
that that requirement did not violate the Constitution under
the reasoning of an earlier case of the Court of Appeal, Grupe
v. California Coastal Commission, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212
Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985). In that case, the court had found that
so long as a project contributed to the need for public access,
even if the project standing alone had not created the need
for access, and even if there was only an indirect relationship
between the access exacted and the need to which the project
contributed, imposition of an access condition on a development permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by
the project to be constitutional. N allan, supra, 177 Cal.
App. 3d, at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30-31; see Grupe, supra,
166 Cal. App., at 165-168, 212 Cal. Rptr., at--; see also
Remmenga v. California Coastal Commission, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 623, 628, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1985). The Court of
Appeal ruled that the record established that that was the
situation with respect to the Nollans' house. N allan, supra,
177 Cal. App. 3d, at 722-723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at 30-31. It
ruled that the Nollans' taking claim also failed because, al-
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though the condition diminished the value of the Nollans' lot,
it did not deprive them of all reasonable use of their property.
Nollan, supra, 177 Cal. App. 3d, at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr., at
30; see Grupe, supra, 166 Cal. App. 3d, at 175-176, 209 Cal.
Rptr., at--. Since, in the Court of Appeal's view, there
was no statutory or constitutional obstacle to imposition of
the access condition, the Superior Court erred in granting
the writ of mandamus. N ollan, supra. The Nollans appealed to this Court, raising only the constitutional question.
II

Had California simply required the Nollans to make an
easement across their beachfront available to the public on a
permanent basis in order to increase public access to the
beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their
house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there
would have been a taking. To say that the appropriation of a
public easement across a landowner's premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest would be to use
words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary
meaning. Indeed, one of the principal uses of the eminent
domain power is to assure that the government be able to require conveyance of just such interests, so long as it pays for
them. J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain §§ 2.1[1],
5.01[5] (Rev. 3d ed. 1985); see id., at §§ 1.42[9], 6.14. Perhaps because the point is so obvious, we have never been confronted with a controversy that required us to rule upon it,
but our cases' analysis of the effect of other governmental
action leads to the same conclusion. We have repeatedly
held that, as to property reserved ·by its owner for private
use, "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' vLoretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 433 (1982), quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). In
Loretto we observed that where governmental action results
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in "a permanent physical occupation of the property," by the
government itself or by others, see 458 U. S., at 432 n. 9,
"our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact
on the owner," 458 U. S., at 434-435. We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for purposes of that
rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous
right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises. 1
Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of
the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, th}Vluestion becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed ~ a condition for issuing a land use permit alters the
outcome. We have long recognized that 1and use regulatiort'
fo~s (sh~f regulation sorestrictive that it
would deRr ·ve the owner f all economically viable use of his
l~ !S law .
ee gms v. 1 uron, 447 U. S. 255,
260-262(1980) (scenic zoning)rf'"enn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978) (landmark preservation);'1?uclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (residential zoning); Laitos and Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 66 (1987). The Commission argues that
among these permissible purposes are protecting the public's
ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming
the "psychological barrier" to using the beach created by a
/
'The holding of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74
(1980), is not inconsistent with this analysis, since there the owner had already opened his property to the general public, and in addition permanent
access was not required. The analysis of Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
supra, is not inconsistent because it was affected by traditional doctrines
regarding navigational servitudes. Of course neither of those cases involved, as this one does, a classic right-of-way easement.
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developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches. We assume, without deciding, that this iss~
in whi~~~n uestiona..Q!y_1¥ould be able
to deny th~eiLP&rmit QJ.ltrighl_ if their new house
(alone;oT-by reason of the cumulative impact produced in
conjunction with othe~ construction) 2 would impede these
pum_q_ses, unless the denial would intrelere so drastically
with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking. See Penn Central, supra.
r
The Commission argues that a permit condition that serves
the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue
the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to
issue the permit would not constitute a taking. We agree.
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the public's ability to see the
beach notwithstanding construction of the new house-for
example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on
fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised its
police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construction _of the .!!_ou~ ~er, imposition of the condition
wou~stihrtional. Moreover (and here we come
closer to the facts of the present case), the condition would be
constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the
Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose ~sighting of the ocean their new house
would interfere. Although such a requirement, constituting
2
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's
attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not contributed to it
more than other coastal landowners, the State's action, even if otherwise
valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is
"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); see also San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 656 (1981) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S.
104, 123 (1978). But that is not the basis of the Nollans' challenge here.

~
?

~

k~

~~

f/-~
'7'1-f~+- /:?)
~~

~~
~

~
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B.

41-

~
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a permanent grant of continuous access to the property,
would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached
to a development permit, the Commission's assumed power
to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the
public's view of the beach must surely include the power to
condition construction upon some concession by the owner,
even a concession of property rights, that serves the same
end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose
would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than
a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the
owner an alternative to that prohibitton which accomplishes
the same purpose is not.
The ev·dent constitutional ropriet disa ears, h~ever,
if the condition su_Q_stituted for the prohibition utterly fails to
fu~her th~n(~d~n'Ceaas the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting
fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those
willing to surrender an easement on their beachfront property. While the ban on shouting fire is a core exercise of the
State's police power to protect the public safety, and thus
meets even our stringent standards for regulation of speech,
requiring that a person wishing to shout fire give up an easement in no way accomplishes that purpose. Th~ State's willingness to refrain from using its olice ower in order to
obtain an ut er unrelate e fit demonstrates that it was
not serious about the threat to the public safety in the first
place. Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a landowner to give up-an easement if he wishes to shout fire is a
lesser restriction on speech than an outright ban, it would not
pass constitutional muster. Similarly here, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, it is not an exercise of the police power,
but "an out-and-out plan of extortion." See J. ED Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12,

7

J {

"/
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14-15 (1981). 3 See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 439 n. 17 (1982).

III
The Commission claims that it concedes as much, and that
we may sustain the conditiQn at issue here by finding that it
is reasonably related -to the public need or burden that the
Nollans' new house creates or to which it contributes. We
need not determine whether the Commission's proposed test
as to how close a "fit" is required is the right one, compare
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. M aunt Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d
375, 380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961) (condition must be
designed to impose on property owner only those costs
"uniquely and specifically attributable" to project) with
Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976)
(rational relationship between burden and exaction required), because the condition that the Nollans give the pubHe an easement across their beachfront does not satisfy even
the most untailored notion of a fit. The Commission's principal contention to the contrary essentially turns on a play on
the word "aceess." The Nollans' new house, the Commission
found, will interfere with "visual access" to the beach. That
in turn (along with oth~r shorefront development) will interfere with the desire of people who drive past the Nollans'
house to use the beach, thus creating a "psychological barrier" to "access." The Nollans' new house will also, by a
process not altogether clear from the Commission's opinion
but presumably potent enough to more than offset the effects
of the psychological barrier, increase the use of the public
a One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the
police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which
the State then waives to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served than would
result from more lenient (but non-tradeable) development restrictions.
Thus, the importance of the purpose underlying the prohibition not only
does not justify the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating the
prohibition, but positively militates against the practice.
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beaches, thus creating the need for more "access." These
burdens on "access" would be alleviated by a requirement
that the Nollans provide "lateral access" to the beach.
Rewriting the argument to eliminate the play on words
makes clear that there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible
to understand how a requirement that-penpteruready on the
public beaches be able to walk ·across the N ollans' property
reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers
any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or
how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them
caused by construction of the Nollans' new house.. We
therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the 2ermit
condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land use
po;e;r~these purposes. Our conclusion on this
point IS consisten w1 the approach taken by every other
court that has considered the question, with the exception of
the California state courts. See Parks v. Watson, 716 F. 2d
646, 651-653 (CA9 1983); Bethlehem Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Lakewood, 626 P. 2d 668, 671-674 (Colo. 1981);
Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission,
160 Conn. 109, 117-120, 273 A. 2d 880, 885 (1970); Longboat
Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Pioneer Trust & Saving Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22
Ill. 2d 375, 176 N. E. 2d 799 (1961); Lampton v. Pinaire, 610
S. W. 2d 915, (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Schwing v. Baton
Rouge, 249 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct. App.), application denied, 259
La. 770, 252 So. 2d 667 (1971); Howard County v. JJM, Inc.,
301 Md. 256, 280-182, 482 A. 2d 908, (1984); Collis v.
Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976); State ex
rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 478 S. W. 2d 363 (Mo.
1972); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144
Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P. 2d 182, 187-188 (1964); Simpson v.
North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 292 N. W. 2d 297 (1980); Briar
West, Inc. v. Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N. W. 2d 730 (1980);
J. ED Associates v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 432 A. 2d 12
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(1981); Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board, 52 N. J.
348, 350-351, 245 A. 2d 336, 337-338 (1968); Jenad, Inc. v.
Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966); Mackall
v. White, 85 App. Div. 696, 445 N. Y.S. 2d 486 (1981), appeal
denied, 56 N. Y. 2d 503, 435 N. E. 2d 1100 (1982); Frank
Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 68-69, 71, 264 A. 2d
910, 913, 914 (1970); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.,
680 S. W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 614
P. 2d 1257, 1258-1259 (Utah 1980); Board of Supervisors v.
Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 136-139, 216 S. E. 2d 199, 207-209 (1975);
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617-618, 137
N. W. 2d 442, 447-449 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U. S. 4
(1966). See also Littlefield v. Akron, 785 F. 2d 596, 607
(CA8 1986).
We are left, then, with the Commission's non-land-use justification for the access requirement:
-- "Fi~ally, the Commission notes that there are several
existing provisions of pass and repass lateral access
benefits already given by past Faria Beach Tract applicants as a result of prior coastal permit decisions. The
access required as a condition of this permit is part of a
comprehensive program to provide continuous public access along Faria Beach as the lots undergo development
or redevelopment." App. 68.
That is simply an expression of the Commission's belief that
the public interest will be served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast. The Commission may
well be right that it is a good idea, but that does not establish
that the N ollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be
compelled to contribute to its realization. Rather, California
is free to advance its "comprehensive program," if it wishes,
by using its power of eminent domain for this "public purpose," see U. S. Const., Amend. V; but if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it.

Reversed.
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